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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15929

JOHNNY FRANK SOSA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Possession of a Dangerous
Weapon by a Convicted Person, a violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-10-503, 1953 as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried in the Second Judicial District

Court for Weber County, before the Honorable Judge Duffy
Palmer, without a jury.

He was found guilty of a third

degree felony as charged on September 22, 1977.

Judge

Palmer sentenced appellant to 0 - 5 years in the Utah State
Prison on June 15, 1978.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks an affirmation of anpellant's
conviction.
STATEI-!ENT OF THE FACTS

On the Fourth day of June, 1977, appellant dron
a van up in front of a group of people on 25th Street in
Ogden and fired at them with a rlfle (R. at 43,44).
Shortly thereafter, three police officers from the
Ogden City Police Department stopped a van matching the
description of the truck driven by appellant

(R. 15 48).

The police were positive that it was appellant who exited
frail' the driver's side when the truck came to a stop (R. at
48,49).

A .22 rifle without a stock but in operable conditi

with a live round in the firing chamber was found under the

front seat and a second, unloaded . 22 rifle was found
the . seats

bet~VeE·

(R. at 51,53).
On the 6th day of June, 1977, a complaint was

issued in Ogden City Court against appellant for carrying
a loaded gun in a vehicle and for rossession of marijuana.
On July 5, 1977, appellant was found guilty of both charges
in that court (R. at 40).
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On June 7, 1977, appellant was charged with
possession of a firearm by a convicted person (R. at 1).
Appellant was tried and convicted of this charge on
September 22, 1977 (R. at 63).
sentenced to serve 0 on June 15, 1977

Appellant was subsequently

5 years at the Utah State Prison

(R. at 66).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

SINCE THE TlvO OFFENSES COMNITTED
BY APPELLANT WERE PROPLERY PROSECUTED
IN SEPARATE COURTS, THE Tlo70
PROSECUTIONS IVERE NOT MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE UNDER UTAH CODE A!<N.
§ 76-1-402(2) I 1953 AS AMENDED.
Appellant contends that the present

prosP~ution

of

a third degree felony, initiated in district court, should
have been precluded under Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-403(l)a,
1953 as amended, by his previous conviction of carrying a
loaded firearm in a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in Ogden
City Court.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-403(l)a, 1953 as amended,
states:
"If a defendant has been prosecuted
for one or more offenses arising out of
a single criminal episode, a subsequent
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prosecution for the same or a different
offense is barred if:
·
(a)
The subsequent prosecution
is for an offense that was or should
have been tried under §-r6-l-402(2)
in the former prosecution."
(Emphasis added)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(2) provides that:
"1\Thenever conduct may establish
offenses under a sing-le criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice,
a defendant should not be subject
to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a)
The offenses are
within the jurisdicti6n of
__a si11gle court."
Appellant contends that under the Utah ConsHtutic:
the district court had technical jurisdiction of both the
third degree felony and the Class B misdemeanor.

The Utah

Constitution, Article VIII § 7 provides:
"The District Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal, not excepted in
this constitution, and not prohibited
by law; appellate jurisdiction from
all inferior courts and tribunals,
and a supervisory control of the
same .
"
Hevertheless, it is clear that the district court
does not have original jurisdiction of both offensrs.
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ThiS

identical question was raised recently in State v. Cooley,
Utah,

575 P.2d 693

(1978).

In that case, the defendant

committed three offenses within the same course of conduct.
Two of the offenses were Class B misdemeanors and the third
was an indictable misdemeanor, triable only in district
court.
P.2d 867

This court cited Hakki v. Faux, 16 U.2d 132, 396
(1964) which held that the jurisdiction of a

district court over a misdemeanor triable in justice's and
city court,
§

(Class B and C misdemeanors; see Utah Code Ann.

78-4-16, 1953 as amended prior to the "Circuit Court Act

of 1977" and § 78-5-4 (1) (a)) could only be invoked by
appeal or where it appears by the certificate that there is no
justice of the peace in the county qualified to try the case.
(Id. at 868)

See also

P.2d 626: 627 (1937).
to note

State v. Telford, 93 Utah 228, 72
In Cooley, supra, this court went on

that:
"Article VIII, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution provides:
The District Court shall
have original jurisdiction in
all matters civil and criminal,
not excepted in this Constitution,
and not prohibited by law; . .
(Emphasis in original).
The legislature did provide by law
the following:
All public offenses triable
in the district courts, except
cases appealed from justices'
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and city courts, must be
prosecuted by information
or indictment. •
(Utah Code Ann., 1953,
77-16-1)
I t thus is evident--th"2lt' the
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, 76-1-402
(2) {a) relating to a single criminal
episode does not apply for the reason
that the crime of failing to stop
a vehicle at the command of a
police officer cannot be tried in the
same court where the other two crimes
must be tried."

As in Cooley, the offenses in the instant case
were only triable in separate courts.

Although the district

court had appellate jurisdiction over the misdemeanor chargE,
it is clear that it had no original -jurisdiction and that
the offense could not have been prosecuted in that court.
This is consistent with State v. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114
P.2d 1034 (194l) wherein the court distinguished original
or independent jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction and
then noted:
"Original jurisdiction as used
in the constitutional provision
means an independent jurisdiction,
one not based upon or limited to
review of another court's judgment
or proceedings."
(Id. at 1038)
The court then stated:
"We determine then that the
constitutional provision does not
mean that regardless of statutory
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rules, practice, and procedure,
any civil or criminal matter, not
expressly prohibited by law, may
be commenced in the District Court.
There being no constitutional
inhibitions, the legislature may
define and prescribe the forum
in which actions may or must be
commenced, and the procedure
necessary to pass from one court to
another."
(Id. at 1039)
Finally, the court held that:
"It appears therefore that the
proper venue for the commencement of
an action for a non-indictable
misdemeanor has been laid in the
justice's court or the city court,
While the District Court has general
jurisdiction in all criminal matters,
the proper procedure in misdemeanor
cases as prescribed by statute is
to commence the action in the city or
justice's court. That ·rs·· the form,
process, and procedure prescribed by
statute for bringing into operation
by appeal the action of the district
court in such cases."
(Id. at 1042)

In the instant case, the jurisdiction of the
district court with respect to appellant's class B misdemeanor
offense was appellate only.

Ogden City Court had no

jurisdiction whatsoever of the felony charge and the district
court had original jurisdiction.

The two offenses were not

within the jurisdiction of a single court and, therefore,
could not have been tried together.

The obvious intent of

llt<Jh Code Ann. § 76-1-403 is to bar multiple prosecutions
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when those actions could have been joined.

To hold that

prosecutions of separate offenses arising from the same
course of conduct are mutually exclusive even when joinder
is not possible would frustrate the intent and purpose of the
legislature in creating and providing -for punishment of the
separate offenses.

Horeover, such a holding would leave the

state in the undesirable position of having to choose to
prosecute only some of the offenses committed by a defendant.
Clearly such a result could, as in the instant case, frustra'
sound public policy and circumvent the demands of justice.
The law as laid down by this court in Cooley, supra, that
ncn-joinable prosecutions are not mutually exclusive should
be upheld and this conviction affirmed.
POINT II.
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IS PROPER
SINCE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY-DOCTRINE
DO:":S NOT Bl'.R A SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION OF A SEPAP~TE NONINCLUDED OFFENSE.
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution
provides:
• nor should any person be
twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense."
This Court held in State v. Harris,
1313

(1974)

30 Utah 2d, 354, 517

that:
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"It is basic that the twice in
jeopardy rule protects against
subsequent prosecution only for the
same offense."
(Id. at 1314).
It was also noted, in State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d
258

(1945)

that:
"A prosecution is for the
entire offense and not for the
separate elements thereof.
If a
prosecution is barred, it bars the
entire action and not merely the
use of certain elements thereof.
So our question is, whether as a
whole the acts charged in the two
actions are the same.
If they are,
then the second prosecution is
barred.
If they are not, then the
action is not barred even though
some of the acts proved in the first
prosecution are also elements of
the second."
(Id. at 262).

The United States Supreme Court follows essentially the same
rule.

In Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (I977), the court

declared that:
"The established test for
determining whether two offenses
are sufficiently distinguishable
to permit the imposition of
cumulative punishment was stated
in Blockburger v. United States,
284 u.s. 299, 304 52 s.ct. 180,
182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932):
'The applicable rule
is that where the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory
provisions, the test
to be applied to determine
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whether there are two
offenses or only one,
is whether each provision
requires proof of an
additional fact which the
other does not.
This test emphasizes the elements of
the two crimes.
'If each requires
proof that the other does not, the
Blockburger test would be satisfied,
notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish
the crimes.
'"
(citations omitted)
"If bvo offenses are the same
under this test for purposes of
barring consecutive sentences at a
single trial, they necessarily will
be the same for purposes of barring
successive prosecutions."
(Id. at 166)
In the instant case, the elements of the
charged in separate prosecutions differ.

offens~

Either offense

could have been established without establishing the other.
Appellant's first conviction was for carrying a
loaded firearm in a vehicle in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-10-SOS:
"Every person who carries a
loaded firearm in a vehicle or
on any public street in an incorporated city or in a prohibited
area of an unincorporated territory
within this state is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor."
(Emohasis added)
(See also Utah Code Ann. 5. 23-20-2]
1953 as amended, which proscribes
the same conduct and, insofar as is
pertinent to this problem, renuires
proof of essentially the same clements).
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A conviction under this statute would require
that any person carried a loaded firearm in a vehicle
within the stated areas.
Appellant's second conviction, which is the subject
of this appeal, was for possession of a dangerous weapon
by a convicted person in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-10-503, 1953 as amended:
"Any person who is not a citizen
of the United States, or any person
who has been convicted of any crime of
violence under the laws of the United
States, the state of Utah, or any
other state, government, or country,
or who is addicted to the use of any
narcotic drug, or any person who has
been declared mentally incompetent
shall not own or have in his
possession or under his custody or
control any dangerous weapon as
defined in this part. Any person
who violates this section is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, and if the
dangerous weapon is a firearm or
sawed-off shotgun he shall be guiltv
of a felony of the third degree.
Under this statute, a prosecution would have to
show that the defendant was one of the types of persons
prohibited from possessing weapons but not that the firearm
was loaded.

In short, the state could have established the

necessary elements for conviction in either prosecution
without establishing the elements required in the other
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prosecution.

In accordance with Harris, Thatcher,

and~

all supra, the doctrine of double or former jeopardy does nc
apply.

See also State v. Gandee, Utah, case No. 15635, file

November 3, 1978.
Appellant cites Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387
(1970) , to indicate that the two offenses need not be

identical for double jeopardy to apply. However,

the.

iss~

in that case concerned the concept of "dual sovereignty".
The court specifically noted that:
"We act on the statement of the
District Court of Appeal that the
second trial on the felony charge by
information 'was based on the same
acts of the appellant as were
involved in the violation of the two
city ordinances' and on the assumption
that the ordinance violations were
included offenses of the felony charge.
Whether in fact and law petitioner
committed separate offenses which
could support senarate changes was not
decided by the Florida courts, nor do
we reach that question.
What is
before us is the asserted power of
the two courts within one state to
place petitioner on trial for the
same alleged crime."
(Id. at 390).
It was assumed in Waller that the two offenses were ide~~
The case cannot be taken to establish that two offenses nee;
not be identical to support a double jeopardv claim.
In Brown v. Ohio, sunra, also rc>lied upon by
appellant, the court noted the ElocY:hurqcr test cit0d i\bove
and then held

th~t:
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"Applying the Blockburger test,
we agree with the Ohio Court of
Appeals that joyriding and auto
theft! as defined by the court,
const1tute 'the same statutory offense'
within the meaning of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. App. 23. For it
is clearly not the case that 'each
statute requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not.'
284 u.s. at 304, 52 S.Ct., at 182. As
is invariably true of a greater and
lesser included offense, the lesser
offense - joyriding - requires no
proof beyond that which is required
for conviction of the greater - auto
theft.
The greater offense is therefore
by definition the 'same' for purposes
of double jeopardy as any lesser
offense included in it."
(Id. at 168)
As has already been noted

in the instant case,

different elements had to be proven in each of the prosecutions,
neither established the other.

Double jeopardy does not apply

and the trial court was correct in ruling that the felony
prosecution was not barred by the prior misdemeanor conviction
in city court.
CONCLUSION
Although appellant was convicted in Ogden City
Court of a misdemeanor arising out of the same course of
conduct which gave rise to the instant felony prosecution, this
action is not barred by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, 1953 as
amenden, because the actions could not have originated in
the same court.
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The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply
because the establishment of each offense requires proof
of different elements:

neither is subsumed within the

other.
For these reasons, appellant's conviction of a thi
degree felony in district court was proper and should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIA~ W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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